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Seton Hall Law

Early Life and Education
Stephen G. Breyer has been an influential member on our nation's highest court

for over twenty years. During that time, Justice Breyer has gained a reputation as a
pragmatic, optimistic and cooperative Supreme Court Justice. Stephen Breyer was bom
August 15, 1938, in San Francisco, Califomi4 to Irving G. Breyer and Anne R. Breyer.

I

Irving Breyer was legal counsel for the San Francisco Board of Education, while Anne
Breyer's work focused on public service. 2 Justice Breyer was exposed to both legal and

political activity at a young age due to his parents' careers. Justice Breyer's middle class
upbringing likely had a large impact on his pragmatic judicial approach.
Stephen and his siblings were raised in a middle-class Jewish household. Both

Breyer and his younger brother, Charles, a current federal district judge, were Eagle

Scouts.3

In

1955, Breyer graduated from Lowell High School, where he regularly

debated in toumaments.a Breyer graduated Stantbrd University

Philosophy, and went on

in

1959,

with a major in

to Magdelen College at Oxford University as a Marshall

Scholar.s Breyer graduated Oxford

in 1961 with First Class Honors.6 Shortly thereafter,

Breyer retumed to the United States to attend Harvard Law School, where he worked as
an editor at the Harvard Law Review. 7 Breyer graduated Harvard Law School magna
cum laude.

8
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In

1967, he married the Hon. Joaruta Freda Hare. a psychologist and member

of

the British aristocracy. The Breyers have three adult children: Chloe, an Episcopal priest
and author of The Closel

Nell, and Michael.

e

Legal Career

Following gaduation from Harvard Law, Breyer clerked with Justice Arthur
Goldberg, an associate justice on the Supreme Court of the United States.r0 Following his

clerkship, Breyer served as a fact checker for the Warren Commission (an investigation
into the assassination of United States President John F. Kennedy that had taken place on
November 22, 1963). Breyer also served as a Special Assistant to the Assistant U.S.
Attomey General for Antitrust from 1 965 until 1967.'

1l

I

1967, Breyer eamed a place as an associate professor at Harvard Law.

12

Breyer officially taught at Harvard Law until 1994 and has maintained a position among
the Harvard Law faculty in some capacity over the years. At Harvard, Breyer was known
as a leading expert on administrative law.

books

on

deregulation:

Breaking

13

the

While there. he vnote two highly influential

Vicious Circle: Toward Elfective Risk

Regulation and Regulation and lts Reform. Breyer also wrote one of the most widely
cited skeptical examinations ofcopyright, The Uneasy Case

for Copyright.

Breyer continued his legal ciueer as an Assistant Special Prosecutor of the
Watergate Special Prosecution Force

e

in

1973.1415

Breyer then joined the U.S. Senate

http://www.supremecout.gov/about/biographies.aspx
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See note 2
The dilemmas ofrisk regulation - Breaking the Vicious Circle by Stephen Breyer, by Sheila Jasanoff
Issues in Science and Technology, Spring 1994.
14
"A buglary tums into a Constitutional crisis" CNM June 16, 2004
13

3

Judiciary Committee, first as Special Counsel (1974 until 1975) and then as Chief
Counsel from 1979 until 1980.

16

His position as Chief Counsel bolstered his reputation

as a competent and capable legal mind among both Democrats and Republicans. He
worked closely with the chairman of the committee, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, to pass
the

Airline Deregulation Act that closed the Civil Aeronautics Board.

r7

Judicial Career

In the last days of President Jimmy Carter's administration, Carter nominated
Breyer to the First Circuit's U.S. Court of Appeals. The U.S. Senate confirmed him on
December 9, 1980, by an 80-10 vote. l8 Breyer maintained a position on the U.S. Cou(

of Appeals for the next fourteen years, acting as the court's Chief Judge from 1990 to
1994.1e During this time, Breyer made a name for himself as a judge who leaned neither

to the left nor the right but satisfied both sides of the aisle by remaining moderate.
He served as a member of the Judicial Conference of the United States between
1990 and 1994 and the United States Sentencing Commission between 1985 and 1989.20

On the sentencing commission, Breyer played a key role in reforming federal criminal
sentencing procedures, producing

the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which

were

formulated to increase uniformity in sentencing.2l

15

A major political scandal that occurred in the United States in the 1970s as a result ofthe June 17, 1972
break-in at the Democratic National Committee (DNC) headquarters at the Watergate oflice complex in
Washington, D.C., and President Richard Nixon's administration's attempted cover-up ofits involvement.
When the conspiracy was discovered and investigated by the U.S. Congress, the Nixon administration's
resistance to its probes led to a Constitutional crisis.
16
See note l0
r?
Thierer, Adam (December 21,2010) Who'll Really Benefit ftom Net Neutrality Regularions? CBS News
18
"Sharp Questions for Judge Breyer". ly's| York Times. July lO,2OO4.
le See note 10
20

See

Note lo
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"Justice Breyer Should Recuse Himself from Ruling on Constitutionality ofFederal Senlencing
Guidelines, Duke Law Professor Says" . Duke University News.

4

Breyer was hit by a car in 1993 while riding his bicycle, and the accident left him

with broken ribs and a punctured lung. That did not deter him from leaving the hospital,
however, to meet with President Clinton in Washinglon when Clinton was considering
nominating him to the Supreme Court. (He lost out to Ruth Bader Ginsburg the first time
around.)

22 23

Breyer's Supreme Court appointment came shortly after the retirement of

Harry Blackmun. President Clinton nominated Breyer as an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court on May 13,1994 and Breyer took his seat August 3, 1994.24

Legal Philosophy
Justice Breyer is considered an integral part of the Court's liberal wing. He is well

known for his pragmatic analysis of cases.25 His decisions are often guided by analyzing
the real life consequences of the people aflected by the court's ruling. This principle can
abandon the strict interpretation some of his fellow justices favor, particularly the more

conservatives ones. Breyer opposes the originalism approach, which
associated

is most

often

with Justice Scalia and demands a strict interpretation of the language of the

Constitution.

26

\n 2006, Breyer said that in

assessing

a law's Constitutionality, while

some of his colleagues "emphasize language. a more literal reading

ofthe IConstitution's]

text, history and tradition". he looks more closely to the "purpose (fiamers intent) and

22

Berke, Richard (June 15, 1993).

'fne Overvlew: Clinto

lo Court". New York Times.
2r

Associated Press, Justice Breyer breaks collarbone in bike accident, Boston.com (May 31, 201

l),

available at
http://www.boston.com,/news/locaVmassachusetts/articles/201

I

/05/31/justice breyer_breaks collarbone_in

_bike-accidenV.
2a
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Note l0

25
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26
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Note 2
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consequences".2T

In many

areas

of the Court, Breyer's pragmatism is considered the

intellectual counterweight to Scalia's textualist philosophy.28
Breyer is recognized to be deferential to the interests of law enforcement and to
legislative judgnents in the Supreme Court's First Amendment rulings. Breyer is known

for respecting decisions made by the legislature, voting to overtum

congressional

legislation at a lower rate than any other Supreme Court justice since 1994.2e Breyer has
consistently voted in favor of abortion rights.3o Breyer rejects Justice Scalia's strict Sixth

Amendment interpretation that

all facts necessary to criminal

punishment must be

submitted to ajury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.3l

Breyer has noted use

of six

interpretive tools

in

describing his interpretive

philosophy: text, history, tradition, precedent, the purpose
consequences

of

competing interpretations.

32

of a

statute, and the

Breyer believes only the last two

difl-erentiate him from textualists on the Supreme Court (such as Scalia). Breyer argues,

"these sources are necessary, however, and

in the former

case (purpose), can

in

fact

provide greater objectivity in legal interpretation than looking merely at what is often
ambiguous statutory text." 33 Breyer argues that considering the impact
interpretations (consequences) is a further way

of

legal

of ensuring consistency with a

law's

intended purpose. 3a Breyer expanded on his judicial philosophy

in Active Liberty:

Interpreting our Democrotic Constitution.

17

"Justice Breyer Favors 'Less Literal' Readings". newsmax.com. February 9,2006
Sullivan, Kathleen M. (February 5, 2006). "Consent ofthe Govemed". New York Times
re
cewirtz, Paul; Golder, Chad (July 6, 2005). "So Who Arc the Activists?". New York Times.
30
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)

:E

3r

Blakely y. Washington, 542 U.5.296 (2004)
Lithwick, Dalia (December 6, 2006). "Justice Grover Versus Justice Oscar". Slate
3r "lnterview with Nina Totenberg". 1r'PR. Septemb€r 30, 2005.
34
Sunstein, Cass R. (May 2006). "Justice Breyer's Democratic Pragmatism". The Yale Law Journal
32

6

Active Liberty

Active Liberty

is considered a

response

to the 1997 book I Matter of

Interpretation, in which Antonin Scalia emphasized adherence to the original meaning of

the text alone.
Constitution

35

or of

In it,

Breyer urges judges

statutes)

to

interpret legal provisions (of the

in light of the purpose of the text and how well the

consequences of specific rulings

will fit those purposes.

ln Active Liberty, Breyer references Isaiah Berlin's Two Concepts of

Liberty.36

The first concept is "freedom from government coercion (negative liberty)". The second
Berlinian concept is "freedom to participate in the government (positive liberty)." Active
Liberty established the importance of positive liberty over the competing idea of negative

liberty. Breyer makes a utilitarian argrunent for judges who are making rulings that can
affect the democratic intention of the Constitution. Breyer states, "the framers of the
Constitution sought to establish a democratic govemment involving the maximum liberty

for its citizens."

MAJORITY OPINIONS
Gray v. Mayland3T
Breyer was assigned the opinion in Gray v. Maryland, a 5-4 decision dealing with

the application of Bruton v. United States.38 Bruton involved two defendants accused

participating

in the same crime and tried jointly before the same jury. One of

of

the

defendants had confessed. His confession named and incriminated the other defendant.

35

Feeney, Mark (October 3, 2005). "Author in the Court: Justice Stephen Breyer's New Book Reflects His
Practical Approach to the Law". Boston Globe.
16
Breyer, Stephen G. Active Liberty: Interpreting a Democratic Constitution. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008. Print.
37523 u.s. 185, I l8
s.ct. I l5l, 140 L.8d.2d294 (1998)
38391 u.s. 123,
88 s.ct. 1620, 20L.Ed.2d 476 (196s).

7

The trial judge issued a limiting instruction, telling the jury that

it

should consider the

confession as evidence only against ths codefendant who had confessed and not against

the defendant named in the confession.3e In Bruton the Court held, despite the limiting
instruction, the introduction of the out-of-court confession at Bruton's trial had violated
his right, protected by the Sixth Amendment, to cross-examine witnesses.

a0

Grav v. Ma{yland differs from Bruton in that the prosecution here redacted the
codefendant's confession by substituting, for the defendant's name in the confession, a

blank space

or the word

"deleted." The Supreme Court decided whether these

substitutions make a significant legal difference. In an opinion considered by Justice

Breyer, the Supreme Court held that Bruton's protective rule applies.al

In

deciding

whether Bruton's protective rule applied to the redacted confession, Breyer considered
both Bruton and a later case, fuchardson v. Marsh, which limited Bruton's scope.a2

In Bruton, the Court recognized that in many circumstances a limiting instruction
would adequately protect one defendant from the prejudicial effects of the introduction at

ajoint trial of evidence intended for

use only against a different defendant.a3 But

it said:

"There are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or
cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of lailure so
vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury
system cannot be ignored. Such a context is presented here, where the
powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who
stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread
before the jury in a joint trial. Not only are the incriminations devastating
to the defendant but their credibility is inevitably suspect.... The
unreliability of such evidence is intolerably compounded when the alleged

3e

ld.

40

39r US. 137,88S.Cr. t628,20 L.Ed.zd 476 (t968).
523 UL l85, 188, I t8 S.Ct. I l5t, I153, 140 L. Ed.2d 294 (1998)

41

4' 481
43

ILL 200, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987)
Id., at 135, 88 S.llt., at 1627-1628

B

accomplice, as here, does not testifr and cannot be tested by crossexamination." a

The Court found that the confession

in

Bruton constituted such

a

"powerfully

incriminating extrajudicial statement," that its introduction into evidence, insulated from
cross-examination, violated Bruton's Sixth Amendment rights.

45

In Richardson v. Marsh, the Court considered a redacted confession. The
involved a joint murder trial

case

of Marsh and Williams. The State had redacted

the

confession of one defendant, Williams, so as to "omit all reference" to his codefendant,

Marsh-"indeed, to omit all indication that anyone other than ... Williams" and a third
person had "participated in the crime."

a6

The Court held that this redacted confession fell

outside Bruton's scope and was admissible (with appropriate limiting instructions) at the

joint trial. The Court distinguished the confession in Bruton as a confession that was
"incriminating on its face," and which had "expressly implicated" Bruton.

In typical Justice Breyer fashion, his opinion

a7

analyzed the consequences of

Bruton's protective rule. He specifically discussed the consequences

ofjury

members

inferring a connection between the redacted confession and the defendant. Justice Breyer
believes an inference pure and simple cannot make the critical difference.

Breyer differentiated the "kinds

of

inferences" a reasonable

a8

Justice

jury could make.

For

example, fuchardson's inferences involved statements that did not refer directly to the

a Id., at 135-136,88 S.Ct., at

o'I4

1628

46

481 U.S. 203, 107 S.Ct. 1705, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987)
481 !LS- at 208, 107 S.Ct., at 1707.
4E
523 US. 185, 195, ll8s.ct. ll5l, 1t56, t4oL.Ed.2d294

a7

(199t)

9

defendant himself and which became incriminating "only when linked with evidence
introduced later at trial."ae

Justice Breyer further discussed whether the inclusion

of

confessions, that

incriminated "by connection", could too often provoke mistrials, or would unnecessarily
lead prosecutors to abandon the confession or joint trial, because neither the prosecutors
nor the judge could easily predict, until after the introduction of all the evidence, whether
or not Bruton had barred use ofthe confession.so Justice Breyer believes blanks, the word

"delete," symbols, or other indications of redaction, within Bruton's protections, run no
such risk, as their use is easily identified prior to trial and does not depend, in any special

way, upon the other evidence introduced in the case.5l

Justice Breyer demonstrated his pragmatic approach by interpreting the statute

broadly. As opposed

to the strict textualist

approach, Justice Breyer constructs his

opinion based on the consequential effects ofthe Supreme Court's holding.
Stenberg v. Carharts2
Stenbere v. Carhart, deals with a Nebraska law that made performing "partial-

birth abortion" strictly illegal, ignoring possible health issues of t}re mother.53 Nebraska
physicians who performed the procedure contrary to the law were subject to having their

medical licenses revoked. The Court struck down the law, finding the Nebraska statute

criminalizing "partial birth abortions" violated the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution.

Uf
lll,

185, 196, I l8 s.ct. I l5l, I157, 140 L. Ed.2d 294 (1998)
523
481
at 209, 107 S.Ct., at 1708.
5' 523
US 185, 197, 118 s.ct. I l5l, 1157, 140 L. Ed.2d 294 (1998)
52
530 U.S. 914 (2000)
53
530 US-914, 120 S.Ct.2597, 14'1L.8d.2d743 (2000)
4e
50

10

(

Justice Breyer, in writing the opinion of the Court, cited Planned Parenthood v.
Casey and said that any abortion law that imposed an undue burden on a woman's "right

to choose" (abortion) was unconstitutional.

sa

He said that causing those who procure

abortions to "fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment" was an undue burden, and
therefore declared the law to be against the Constitution.

s5

Justice Breyer relied on three established principles

to formulate his opinion.

First, before "viability ... the woman has a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy."
Second,

"a law designed to further the State's interest in fetal life which imposes

an

undue burden on the woman's decision before fetal viability" is unconstitutional. Third,

"

'subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human

life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary,

in

appropriate medical judgment,

for the preservation of the life or health of

the

mother."56

Justice Breyer concluded that the Nebraska's statute violated the Federal
Constitution for two independent reasons. First, the law lacks any exception "for the
preservation of the ... health of the mother." Second,

it "imposes an undue burden on

a

woman's ability" to choose a partial birth abortion, thereby unduly burdening the right to
choose abortion itself.

57

Had Nebraska's statute included an exception for the life and health ofthe mother,

Breyer states, the issue presented would be quite different. Justice Breyer believes an
abortion regulation constitutes an undue burden if it "has the purpose or effect ofplacing
54

505

"56

l-d.

57

u.s.833, ttz s.ct. 2791,

120 L.Ed.zd 614.

530 u.s. 914, 918, t20 s.ct.2597,2603, t47 L. Ed.2di43 (2000)
530 US. 914, 929-30, 120 S.Ct. 2597,2608-09, 14',7 L. Ed.2d'143 (2000)
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(

a substantial obstacle in the path

If

ofa woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." 58

there were adequate altemative methods for a woman safely to obtain an abortion

before viability,

it is unlikely that prohibiting

the procedure alone would "amount in

practical terms to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion."sg
Justice Breyer's opinion in Stenbere exemplifies his pragmatic judicial approach.

His analysis is concemed with the consequences that Nebraska's law could have on
United States citizens. He provides circumstances where women would be unduly
burdened by such a law and even goes on to discuss the burdens doctors would face.

NLRB v. Noel Canning6o
National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Cannins, was a United States Supreme
Court case in which the Court unanimously ruled that the President of the United States
can only use his aulhority under the Recess Appointment Clause of the United States
Constitution when the United States Senate is in recess and not able to transact Senate
business. The Court held that the clause allows the president

to make appointments

during both intra-session and inter-session recesses, but only if the recess is of sufficient
length, and if the Senate is actually unavailable for deliberation.

6r

Justice Breyer tackled three issues in his written opinion. The first issue addressed

the scope of the phrase "the recess ofthe Senate" and whether that is limited to the intersession recess between the two formal annual sessions
session recesses. Given the ambiguity

ofa

Congress, or extends to intra-

of the specific text of the clause, the Court held

that the clause's purpose is broad, allowing the President to ensure the continued
5E

530 U.S. 914, 950-51, 120 S.Ct. 2597 ,2619-20, 147 L. Ed.2d 743 (2000)

"60

]d.

134 S.Ct.2550, 189 L. Ed.2d 538 (2014)
6' 134 S.Ct.2550,2578, 189 L. Ed.2d 538 (2014)
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functioning of govemment even when the Senate is away.62 To strengthen this antitextualist approach, Breyer offered strong historical support for the broad interpretation.63

The second issue addressed the phrase "vacancies that may happen during the
recess

of the Senate." Justice Breyer believed that the clause's language, read literally,

permits, though it does not naturally favor, his broader interpretation.a Thomas Jefferson

admitted that the clause is subject to two constructions, and the Court argued that a
narrow interpretation risks undermining powers granted by the Constitution. The opinion
found that the phrase applies to both vacancies that occur during a recess, and those that
occur before and continue to exist through a recess.

65

Finally, the opinion dealt with the calculation of the length of the Senate's recess.
The Solicitor General argued that the Senate was not actually in session when meeting
were held in pro forma sessions. Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, stated, "We hold

that, for purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, the Senate is in session when it
says

it is, provided

business."66

that, under its own rules,

it

retains the capacity to transact Senate

The Supreme Court held that pro forma sessions count as sessions, not

recesses, consistent

with the Constitution's delegation of authority to the Senate to

determine how it conducts its own business.

Justice Breyer's opinion demonstrated that he
interpretation

of a

is not confined by the

strict

statute's text. Justice Breyer applied a broad interpretation when

analyzing the Recess Appointment Clause. Justice Breyer provided historical support to
62

134 S.Ct.2550,2561, 189 L. Ed.2d 538 (2014)
134 s.ct. 2550,2561, 189 L. Ed.2d 538 (2014)
61
134 S.Ct. 2550,2567, 189 L. Ed.2d 538 (2014)
63

u'.[.d.
66

t34 S.Ct.2550,2555, 189 L. Ed.2d 53S (2014)

13

show that, even in the times of our founding fathers, laws can be made with a broad
purpos9.

CONCURRING OPINIONS
J. Mclntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro6T
J. Mclntyre Machinerv v. Nicastro was a decision by the United States Supreme
Court which ruled that a court may not exercise jurisdiction over a defendant that has not

purposefully availed itself of doing business in the jurisdiction or placed goods in the
stream of commerce in the expectation they would be purchased in the jurisdiction.

An accident cut four fingers off the right hand of Robert Nicastro. Mr. Nicastro
was operating a recycling machine used
manufactured the machine and sold

to cut

scrap metal.68

A

British company

it through its exclusive U.S. distributor. Nicastro

sued J. Mclntyre Machinery, Ltd., the British company, and its U.S. distributor, Mclntyre

Machinery America, Ltd., in the Bergen County vicinage of the Law Division of the
Superior Court of New Jersey, under a strict product liability theory.6e The British parent
company moved to dismiss the suit against it for lack of personal jurisdiction.

In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have
jurisdiction.

T0

According to Justice Keruredy's plumlity opinion, the facts may reveal

intent to serve the U.S. market, but they do not show that J. Mclntlre purposefully
availed itself of the New Jersey market. Tl According to Kennedy, respondent did not
establish that J. Mclntyre engaged

67

131

68

l3l

u'Ld.

s.cr. 2780
s.ct. 2780, 2782,

t8O

in conduct purposefully directed at New

Jersey.

L.Ed.2d765 (201l)

l3l sel 2780, 2791, t80 L. Ed.2d 765 (201l)
7' 131
S.Q!. 2780, 2790, 180 L. Ed.2d'765 (201l)
70

t4

Although the company targeted the United States as a whole, only its distributor targeted

the specific states. The stream of cornnerce theory is insufficient to give rise to
jurisdiction without specific targeting of a specific
Justice Breyer concurred

state.72

in the judgment on narrower grounds.T3 In Breyer's

view, the outcome of this case was determined by the Supreme Court's precedent cases.
Rather than announce a broad rule, Breyer determined that based on the facts of this
specific case New Jersey did not have jurisdiction because so few machines wound up in
the state.

7a

According to Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted a broad
understanding

of the scope of

personal jurisdiction based

on its view that "the

increasingly fasfpaced globalization of the world economy has removed national borders

as barriers to trade." He acknowledges the recent changes in commerce

and

communication that could not have been anticipated by the Supreme Court's precedents.

However, Justice Breyer does not see any of those issues in this case. Justice Breyer
stated,

"l think it

unwise

to

announce

a rule of broad applicability without full

consideration of the modem-day consequences."T5

According to Justice Breyer, respondent Robert Nicastro failed to meet his burden
to demonstrate that it was Constitutionally proper to exercise jurisdiction over petitioner

J. Mclntyre Machinery, Ltd. (British Manufacturer), a British firm that manufactures

1'

t3t s.ct.2780,2784,

?3

l3l

'o Ld.
75

l3l

S!!

2780,

180 L. Ed. 2d 765 (201l)

2i9t, tB}L.Ed.2d765

s.ct.2780,2791,

180 L. Ed.2d 765

(2011)

(20

)

15

scrap-metal machines in Great Britain and sells them through an independent distributor
in the United States (American Distributor).?6

Justice Breyer's concurring opinion

in J. Mclntyre perfectly

summarizes his

pragmatic neutral approach. Justice Breyer's statement,'1 think it unwise to announce a

rule of broad applicability without full consideration of the modem-day consequences,"
exemplifies the way he rules on cases. Justice Breyer is aware that with changing times
comes changing technology and communication.

With these changes, it is necessary for

laws and statutes to change with them. This opinion also shows Justice Breyer's neutral

opinion. Whereas most judges (for example Scalia) consistently vote either

or liberally, Justice Breyer is willing to analyze each case with

an

unbiased mind. This is evident by the fact that he believes there should be a rule

of

conservatively

nanow applicability.

DISSENTING OPINIONS
Glossip v. GrossTT
Glossip v. Gross is a 2015 United States Supreme Court case that ruled executions
carried out by a three-drug protocol of midazolam, pancuronium bromide, and potassium
chloride did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to

the United States Constitution.TE The petitioners argued that the midazolam, intended to

be used as sedative, would not render them unable to feel the pain of the other two
drugs.Te

"n Id.
t35 s.ct.27z6
7E

7e

B5 s.ct.2726,27 46, t92 L.
135 s.cl.2726,2729,192 L.

Ed. 2d 761 (2015)
Ed. zd76l (2015)
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Justice Breyer did not address the primary issue
broader issue dealing with Constitutional interpretation.
argued that the Constitutionality

of the

case, but discussed a

In a written dissent,

Breyer

of a punishment must be evaluated based on current

social and legal standards. Justice Breyer pointed to fundamental Constitutional defects

of the death penalty: (1)

serious unreliability, (2) arbitrariness

in application,

(3)

unconscionably long delays that undermine the death penalty's penological purpose, and
(4) most places within the United States have abandoned its use.80

Justice Breyer attached studies that show that the exoneration rate is
disproportionately high with capital crimes, which reflects both cases
defendant was acfually innocent and cases

in which

in which

the

there was procedural error.

Therefore, the death penalty is not reliably applied to cases in which the defendant has
been properly convicted of crimes that society harshly condemns.El Researchers estimate

that about 4% ofthose sentenced to death are actually innocent.82

Additionally, Justice Breyer points to studies showing that factors other than the
egregiousness of the

crime-such

as the race and gender

of the defendant and the victim,

the location of the crime, and political pressures-influence the imposition of the death
penalty, and such arbitrariness results in the punishment being unconstitutionally cruel.83

Numerous studies, for example, have concluded that individuals accused of murdering
white victims, as opposed to black or other minority victims, are more likely to receive

Etl35 S.Ct.2726,2758, t92 L. Ed.2d'761 (2015)
82
Gross, O'Brien, Hu, & Kennedy, Rate ofFalse Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced
to Death, 111 Proceeding ofthe National Academy ofSciences 7230 (2014)
83l35

S-L2726,2760, 192L. Ed.2d76t (2015)
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the death penalty.Ea Justice Breyer also discussed the excessive long periods of time that
individuals tlpically spend on death row before being executed.85
Justice Breyer argued that the nation has consistently been moving away from the
use

ofthe death penalty, to the point that it is used

so rarely that

it should be considered

"cruel and unusual' for the purpose of the Eighth Amendment. In the last two decades,

the imposition and implementation of the death penalty have increasingly

become

unusual and last year, in 2014, only seven States carried out an execution.86

District of Columbia v. HellefT
District of Columbia v. Heller, was a case in which the Supreme Court of the
United States held in a 5-4 decision that the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects an individual's right to possess a firearm for traditionally la*firl
purposes, such as self-defense within the home.

Justice Breyer filed

a dissenting opinion, which sought to

demonstrate that,

starting from the premise of an individual-rights view, the District of Columbia's handgun

ban and trigger lock requirement would nevertheless be permissible limitations on the

right.88 According

to

Justice Breyer, the majority's conclusion

is wrong for

two

independent reasons. The first reason is that the Second Amendment protects militiarelated, not self-defense-related, interesls.8e Justice Breyer believes these two interests are
sometimes intertwined. To assure l8th-century citizens that they could keep arms for

militia purposes would necessarily have allowed them to keep arms that they could have
& GAO, Report to the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary: Death Penalty Sentencing
E5B5 S.Ct.2726,27U, 192 L. Ed. 2d 761 (2015)

B5 S.Ct.2726,2772, 192 L.Ed.2d76l (2015)
128 s.cr.2783 (20t4)
88
554 u.s. 570, 681 , t2g s.ct.2i83,2847, tit L.Ed.2d
t'Ld.
E6

87

637 (2009\
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used for self-defense as well. But self-defense alone, detached from any militia-related

obiective, is not the Amendment's concem.eo

is that the protection the Amendment

Breyer's second independent reason
provides

is not

absolute.

el According to Justice Breyer, the Amendment permits

to regulate the interests that it

serves. Thus, irrespective

of what those

interests are-whether they do or do not include an independent interest in

self-defense-

govemment

the majority's view cannot be correct unless it can show that the District's regulation is
unreasonable or inappropriate in Second Amendment terms.

Justice Breyer believes the purpose of those who wrote the Second Amendment

was to help assure citizens that they would have arms available for purposes

of

self-

defense.e2 Justice Breyer points out that a legislature could reasonably conclude that the

law will advance goals of great public importance, namely, saving lives, preventing
injury, and reducing crime. However he believes the law is tailored to the urban crime
problem, in that it is local in scope and thus affects only a geographic area both limited in
size and entirely urban; the law concems handguns, which are specially linked to urban

gun deaths and injuries, and which are the overwhelmingly favorite weapon of armed
criminals; and at the same time, the law imposes a burden upon gun owners that seems

proportionately

no

greater than restrictions

in

existence

at the time the

Second

Amendment was adopted.e3 Based on these circumstances, Justice Breyer believes the
District's law falls within the zone that the Second Amendment leaves open to regulation
by legislatures.
e0

!-d.

Ld.
",,554
e3

US

570, 682, 128 S.Ct. 2783,

284748,l'tl

L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008)

ld.

1.9

Justice Breyer's dissent looks to early municipal fire-safety laws that forbade the

storage

of

gunpowder, and on nuisance laws providing fines

or loss of firearm for

imprudent usage, as demonstrating the Second Amendment has been understood to have
no impact on the regulation ofcivilian firearms.ea Justice Breyer argues the public safety
necessity of gun-control laws, quoting that "guns were responsible for 69 deaths in this

country each day."e5

With these two supports, the Breyer dissent goes on to conclude, "there simply is

no untouchable Constitutional right guaranteed by the Second Amendment to

keep

loaded handguns in the house in crime-ridden urban areas."e6 He proposes that firearms

laws be reviewed by an interest-balancing approach of Second Amendment protections
against the govemment's compelling interest of preventing crime.

Justice Breyer believes adoption of a true stricrscrutiny standard for evaluating

gun regulations would be impossible because almost every gun-control regulation will
seek

to advance (as the one here does) a "primary concem of every govemment-a

concem for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens."eT The Court has deemed that

interest, as well as "the Govemment's general interest

in

preventing crime,"

to

be

"compelling," and the Court has in a wide variety of Constitutional contexts found such
public-safety concems sufficiently forceful to justifu restrictions on individual liberties.e8
Thus, any attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny to gun regulations

will in practice tum

into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the Second Amendment

e4

554 u.s. 570, 684 , t2g s.ct.2783,2949, t7 | L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008)
,5 554
11S.570, 694, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2854, t7t L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008)
,6 554
Us. 570, 722,128 S.Ct.2'783,2870, t7l L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008)
e7
United States v. Salemo,48l U.S. 739,755, lO7 S.Ct.2095,95 L.Ed.2d 697 (tg8't\.
e6
Brandenburg v. Ohio,395LJ.5.444,447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.zd 430 (1969)

20

on one side and the govemmental public-safety concems on the other, the only question
being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the former in the course

of

advancing the latter. Justice Breyer would simply adopt such an interest-balancing

inquiry explicitly.ee
Again, this opinion personifies Justice Breyer's pragmatic approach. He analyzed
the laws purpose through historical support and was concemed about the consequences

such

a law.

Justice Breyer used

all six

interpretive tools

of

in writing his dissent.

Interestingly, Justice Breyer used a very lextualist approach as to the Second Amendment

protecting only militia-related, not self-defense-related, interests. Typically the more
conservative Justices interpret statutes with this strict textual approach.

McCutcheon v. FECrm
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission was a campaign finance case before

the United States Supreme Court challenging Section 441 of the Federal Election
Campaign

Act (FECA), which imposed a biennial

aggregate

limit on

individual

contributions to national party and federal candidate committees.r0r The Supreme Court
held that the statutory aggregate limits on how much money a donor may contribute in

total to all political candidates or committees violated the First Amendment.l02 Chief
Justice John Roberts wrote in

{rfl}inion

that "The govemment may no more

restrict how many candidates or causes a donor may support than it may tell a newspaper
how many candidates it may endorse."lo3

ep-e-LHcler, 554 U.S.
roo
134 SeL 1434
r0r 134
ro2

SlL

570, 689, 128 S.Ct.2783,2851-52, t7

| L. Ed.2d
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(2008)

1434, 188 L. Ed. 2d 468 (2014)

Jd.

'03 134

S-e! A34,1438,188

L. Ed. 2d 468 (2014)
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According

to

Justice Breyer, the majority's legal analysis

is faulty as it

misconstrues the nature ofthe competing Constitutional interests at stake. Justice Breyer
argues their opinion eviscerates our Nation's campaign finance laws, "leaving a remnant

incapable of dealing with the grave problems of democratic legitimacy that those laws
were intended to resolve."lM

Breyer point out that the decision "creates a loophole that

will allow a single

individual to contribute millions of dollars to a political party or to a candidate's
campaign.l0s In the absence of limits on aggregate political contributions, donors can and

likely will find ways to channel millions ofdollars to parties and to individual candidates,
producing precisely the kind
previously led the Court

of "comrption" or

to hold

"appearance

of

aggregate limits Constitutional.

believes those opportunities for circumvention

will

comrption" that

106

Justice Breyer

also produce the type of comrption

that concerned the plurality. Justice Breyer states, '1he methods for using today's opinion

to evade the law's individual contribution limits are complex, but they are well known, or

will

become well known, to party fundraisers."ro7

Justice Breyer is not blind to the fact that this ruling creates a loophole that

will

allow a single individual to contribute millions of dollars to a political party or to
candidate's campaign. Justice Breyer bases his dissent

a

off the financial and social

consequences (such as the creation of loopholes) such a ruling would inevitably have on

our society. Justice Breyer is looking towards the future and is aware of the rippling
effects ofthe Supreme Court's holding.

'*ld
I05134
16134

ro7ld.

Se!, u34, t465,188 L. Ed. 2d 468 (2014)
S-e! U34, 1472, 188 L. Ed. 2d 468 (2014)
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Arizona v. GantloE
Arizona v. Gant was a United States Supreme Court decision holding that the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires law enforcement officers to
demonstrate an actual and continuing threat to their safety posed by an arrestee, or a need

to preserve evidence related to the crime of arrest from tampering by the arrestee, in order

to

justi$ a warrantless vehicular

search incident to arrest conducted after the vehicle's

recent occupants have been arrested and secured.l@ The Supreme Court held that police

may search the vehicle, of its recent occupant after his anest, only

if it is reasonable

to

believe that the arestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the

vehicle contains evidence

of the offense of the anest. ll0 The Court

reasoned that

"warrantless searches are per se unreasonable" and subject only to a few, very narrow
exceptions.l

I

I

Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, where he lamented that the court could

not create a new goveming rule. Justice Breyer believes Beltonl12 is best read as setting
forth a bright-line rule that permits a warrantless search of the passenger compartment

of

an automobile incident to the lawful arrest of an occupant-regardless of the danger the
arrested individual in fact poses.

ro€

129

r@

556

rro

ld.

S{!.

l Tto
u.s.332,361,

129

s.ct. t7 to, t73o,l 23 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009)

frr Relying on Katz v. United States,389 U.S.347,357,88
S.Cr.507, lg L.Ed,.2d 576.
r12
New York v. Belton. 453 U.S. 454, l0l S.Cr. 2360, 69 L.Ed.2d 768-which held that police may search
the passenger compartment ofa vehicle and any containers therein as a contemporaneous incident ofa
recent occupanl's lawful arrest on the ground that it concerned the scope of a search incident to arrest but
did not answer the question whether officers may conduct such a search once the scene has been secured.

Justice Breyer argues that the Belton rule has been followed, not only by the
Supreme Court

in Thornton v. United Statesll3, but also by numerous other courts.

Therefore he believes principles of stare decisis must apply, and those who wish this

Court to change a well-established legal precedent (where, as here, there has been
considerable reliance on the legal rule in question) bear a heavy burden.lla Accordingly,
Justice Breyer did not find that burden to have been met. Nor did he believe that the other

considerations ordinarily relevant when determining whether

to ovemrle a case are

satisfied. ll5
Justice Breyer's dissent exemplifies why he is considered in the middle of the

conservative- liberal paradigm.

It is uncommon for Breyer to argue

against creating a

new goveming rule, especially a rule that would give citizens additional rights. However,

when analyzing Breyer's motives,
based

offofthe legislative effects

it is clear that Justice

Breyer is making his opinion

such a ruling could have. Breyer understands that there

are times and circumstances for making drastic changes to laws, but he does not believe

this is one of those circumstances. If the Supreme Court rules against a

precedent

holding, a landfall oflegal issues could occur.

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlingtonll6

r13

Thornton v. United States,54l U.S. 615, 124 S.Ct.2t27,158 L.Ed.2d 905 (2004)
Relying on Cf. L€egin Creative Leather Products- Inc. y. PSKS. Inc., 551 U.S. B7j
2705,2719Jr, 168 L.Ed.2d 623 (200't)
|
'5556 U.S. 332, 354-55, 129 S.Ct. t710, 1725-26,173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009)
rra

r16
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lZ7 S.Ct.

,

-,

s.ct. l5lo
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Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlinglon was a United

States Supreme Court case

in which the Court held that officials may strip-search

individuals who have been arrested for any crime before admitting the individuals to jail,
even

ifthere is no reason to suspect that the individual is carrying contraband.lrT
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed the lower court,

holding that the strip searches for inmates entering the general population of a prison do
not violate the Fourth Amendment.rrs The Court concluded that a prisoner's likelihood of
possessing contraband based on the severity

of the current offense or an

arrestee's

criminal history is too difficult to determine effectively. The Court pointed out instances,
such as the arrest of Timothy McVeigh, in which an individual who commits a minor

traffic offense is capable of extreme violence.lle The majority argued that strip
are needed (1)

to

detect injuries

or

diseases, such as

searches

lice, that might spread in

confinement, (2) to identify gang tattoos, which might reflect a need for special housing

to avoid violence, and (3) to detect contraband, including drugs, guns, knives, and even
pens or chewing gum, which might prove harmful or dangerous in prison.

120

Justice Breyer dissented, expressing that strip searches of individuals arrested for

minor offenses that do not involve drugs or violence are unreasonable unless the prison

official has a reasonable suspicion that that individual possesses drugs or contraband.
Justice Breyer understands that managing a

jail or prison is an "inordinately difficult

undertaking," and that prison regulations that interfere with important constitutional
interests are generally valid as long as they are "reasonably related
r17

132

l18

Id.

S-eL l5lo, t5l

rre 132

S-e! l5lo,

'20 132

S-eL

l,

to

legitimate

182 L. Ed.2d 566 (2012)

1520, tB2 L. Ed.2d 566 (2012)
1510, 1528, 182 L.F,d.2d,566 (2012)
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penological interests."r2lAdditionally, Breyer believes finding injuries and preventing
the spread of disease, minimizing the threat of gang violence, and detecting contraband
are "legitimate penological interests and that we normally defer to the expertise

in such matters.

and prison administrators

"particular" invasion

of

I22

ofjail

Nonetheless, Breyer point out that the

interests must be "reasonably related"

to the justifring

"penological interest" and the need must not be "exaggerated.-123. It is at this point that
Breyer parts company with the majority.

Breyer opined that there is no convincing reason, in the absence of reasonable
suspicion, that involuntary strip searches

of

those arrested for minor offenses are

necessary in order to further the penal interests mentioned.

124

Breyer points to empirical

evidence on strip-searches suggesting there is no convincing reason that, in the absence

of reasonable suspicion, involuntary strip-searches of those arrested lor minor

offenses

are necessary. Breyer cited a study conducted in New York under the supervision

federal courts, where out

of

of

23,000 people searched, only one inmate had hidden

contraband in his body in a way that would have avoided detection by x-ray and a patdown.r25 Additionally, a cited Califomia study found only three instances out

of

75,000

inmates strip-searched in a five-year period.126

Similar to Glossip, Justice Breyer uses studies to bolster his argument. Justice
Breyer looks at the marginal success rates of these strip searches, and when considering

'2'Id.
t22
ld.
441 US., at 559,99 S.Ct. l86l
S-eL l5lo, 1528, tB2L.Ed.2d 566 (2012\
S-eL 1510, 1528, tB2L.Ed.2d 566 (20t2)
126
132 S-e!. l5lo, 1529, tB2L. Ed. zd 566 (20t2)
'23

'24 132
r25
132
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the prisoner's loss of liberty, Breyer does not believe the pros outweigh the cons in
allowing these searches.

United States v. Bookerl2T
United States v. Booker is a United States Supreme Court decision conceming
criminal sentencing. The Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial requires
that, other than a prior conviction, only facts admitted by a defendant or proved beyond a
reasonable doubt to a jury may be used to calculate a sentence exceeding the prescribed

statutory maximum sentence, whether the defendant has pleaded guilty or been convicted
at trial.128 The maximum sentence ajudge may impose is a sentence based upon the facts

admitted by the defendant or proved to ajury beyond a reasonable doubt.r2e

In a split but majority ruling, the Court struck down the provision of the federal
sentencing statute that required federal district judges to impose a sentence within the
Federal Guidelines range, along with the provision that deprived federal appeals courts

the power to review sentences imposed outside the Guidelines range.
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of

The Court

instructed federal district judges to impose a sentence with reference to a wider range

of

sentencing factors set forth in the federal sentencing statute, and directed federal appeals

courts

to

review criminal sentences

for

"reasonableness." which

the Court left

undefined.l3I
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Justice Breyer argued on historical grounds that the Guidelines scheme is
Constitutional across the board.l32 Justice Breyer reiterated his disagreement with the
Aporendi rulel33, and then identified specific reasons not to apply the Blakelv holding to

the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Most importantly he believes the facts used to
determine a defendant's sentence has historically been solely within a judge's discretion,
and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines should be treated no differently.r3a Breyer believes

creating a system that frustrates the goal of increased sentencing uniformity hardly seems

fair to defendants or to the public at large. Breyer states to the extent that the Guidelines
did not adequately take into account an aggravating or mitigating circumstance,
was free to depart from the Guidelines range.

As

stated above, Breyer played

sentencing procedures, producing

a

judge

135

a key role in

reforming federal criminal

the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which

were

formulated to increase uniformity in sentencing. It is no surprise that, when considering
Justice Breyer's employment history, that he supported the Federal Sentencing Guideline.
Justice Breyer believes sentencing uniformity is the fairest system lor defendants.

Conclusion
Justice Breyer continues to be an influential and key member of our Supreme

Court over the past two decades. Justice Breyer's pragmatic approach balances the

132

543 a;220,235, 125 S. Ct.738,751, 160 L. Ed.2d 621 (2005)
In Aoorendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the defendant
pleaded guilfy to second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, which carried a prison
term of 5-to-10 years. Thereafter, the trial court found that his conduct had violated New Jersey's "hate
crime" law because it was mcially motivated, and imposed a l2-year sentence. The Supreme Court set
aside the enhanced sentence holding: "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitt€d to a jury, and proved
1r3

beyond a reasonable doubt."
t34
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5$ A5220,234, 125 S. Ct. 738,750, 160 L. Ed.2d 621 (2005)
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purpose
see

ofa

statute with the consequences of competing interpretations.

It is refreshing to

a Justice who bases their judicial opinion on societal consequences and does not

apply a strict interpretation to our Constitution. Justice Breyer is aware that laws must
adapt and change based

offof

the shifting views

ofour society.
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